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I.

INTRODUCTION

Over the last several years, there has been much publicity
surrounding the cryptocurrency Bitcoin, its wildly fluctuating value, and
whether or not it is actually secure. 1 Further, there is vast deliberation in
many public forums as to whether Bitcoin will be adopted widely enough
to become mainstream globally so that its use will spread outside of its
current predominant specialized use as an alternative asset investment for
currency speculators and become accepted in small local cafes and large
multinational banks alike. 2 Additionally, there are vast legal questions
surrounding Bitcoin. 3 Although the debate concerning the use and
adoption of Bitcoin beyond an alternative asset will likely continue for
several years, the technology underlying Bitcoin is widely regarded as the
next ‘big thing’ that will transform the operations of many businesses,
* J.D., University of Tennessee College of Law. The author will join Norton Rose
Fulbright’s Houston office in September of 2018.
See Ryan Derousseau, Bitcoin for Beginners: 3 Things to Know Before You Invest, FORTUNE
(Nov. 24, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/11/24/bitcoin-cryptocurrency-investing/;
David Meyer, Bitcoin and Ethereum Prices Take a Hit After Another Cryptocurrency Was Hacked,
FORTUNE (Nov. 21, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/11/21/bitcoin-price-ethereumprice-tether-hacked/; Lucinda Shen, Bitcoin Just Surged Past $8,000. Here's What's Causing
the Spike, FORTUNE (Nov. 17, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/11/17/ bitcoin-pricehard-fork-segwit2x/.
1

See Riley McDermid, The Real Estate Industry is Beginning to Use Bitcoin to Pay for Deals, S.F.
BUS. TIMES (Nov. 22, 2017), https://www.bizjournals.com/sanfrancisco/news/
2017/11/22/real-estate-bitcoin-payment.html; Danielle Sabrina, You Are Now Able to Use
Cryptocurrencies in Person, THE HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 17, 2017),
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/you-are-now-able-to-use-cryptocurrencies-inperson_us_5a0ee51be4b0e30a95850609.
2

See V. Gerard Comizio, Virtual Currencies: Growing Regulatory Framework and Challenges in
the Emerging Fintech Ecosystem, 21 N.C. BANKING INST. 131, 132 (2017); Joshua J. Doguet,
The Nature of the Form: Legal and Regulatory Issues Surrounding the Bitcoin Digital Currency System,
73 LA. L. REV. 1119, 1121, 1131–36 (Summer 2013).
3
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both small and large. 4 This technology—called blockchain—has many
applications that will likely impact the vast majority of industries from
small agriculture businesses to the larger financial institutions in the
world. 5 However, like Bitcoin, because of the relative newness of
blockchain, many legal questions have not yet been answered by courts
and are currently being debated by legal experts, scholars, and
practitioners. 6
This paper analyzes one potential antitrust issue, specifically the
antitrust risks relating to horizontal agreements to not deal with particular
firms when implementing blockchain as a means to assist with transactions
among financial institutions and other parties. 7 This particular use of
blockchain is highly relevant as many major financial institutions are
already testing and implementing the utilization of blockchain in this area. 8
See Clifton Leaf, Believe the Hype: Here's the Actual Next Big Thing in Tech, FORTUNE (Aug.
22, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/08/22/blockchain-next-big-thing-tech/; The next
big thing, THE ECONOMIST (May 9, 2015), https://www.economist.com/news/ specialreport/21650295-or-it-next-big-thing; Rachel Wolfson, Blockchain Technology’s Next Big
Superstar, THE HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 8, 2017), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/
entry/blockchain-technologys-next-big-superstar_ us_ 59b2bb45e4b0c50640cd66c2.
4

See Clifton Leaf, Believe the Hype: Here's the Actual Next Big Thing in Tech, FORTUNE (Aug.
22, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/08/22/blockchain-next-big-thing-tech/; The next
big thing, THE ECONOMIST (May 9, 2015), https://www.economist.com/news/ specialreport/21650295-or-it-next-big-thing; Rachel Wolfson, Blockchain Technology’s Next Big
Superstar,
THE HUFFINGTON POST
(Sept.
8,
2017),
https://www.
huffingtonpost.com/entry/blockchain-technologys-next-big-superstar_us_
59b2bb45e4b0c50640cd66c2.
5

See generally Comizio, supra note 3, at 141–59 (describing legal and regulatory initiatives
in the United States); Elizabeth Sara Ross, Nobody Puts Blockchain in a Corner: The Disruptive
Role of Blockchain Technology in the Financial Services Industry and Current Regulatory Issues, 25
CATH. U. J. L. & TECH. 353, 376–85 (2017) (describing United States and international
regulation efforts).
6

ABA Section of Antitrust Law, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 490 (Jonathan I.
Gleklen et al. eds., 7th ed. 2012).

7

See Bernard Marr, Practical Examples Of How Blockchains Are Used In Banking And The
Financial Services Sector, FORBES (Aug. 10, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
8
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Further, the larger financial institutions have already joined together to
implement this technology; thus, antitrust issues are already a concern. 9
Specifically, Part II of this paper provides a background and
general overview of blockchain and its technology, including an
explanation of the components of blockchain, how this technology works,
a discussion of how blockchain is currently used, how the use of this
technology might shift over the coming years, and the industries that are
most likely to utilize this technology. 10
Part III will focus on one particular use of blockchain—payment
and transfers of large sums of money between financial institutions, their
clients, and other large organizations. 11 This part further discusses ways in
which the financial industry has already begun experimenting with and
implementing blockchain technology within this specific application, the
benefits that blockchain affords this industry, and the likely wide-spread
adoption of this technology in this industry through the collaboration of
many global financial institutions. 12
Next, Part IV raises specific antitrust issues and risks that are likely
to arise from the collaboration of financial institutions using blockchain
as a means to track, record, and audit payments between financial
bernardmarr/2017/08/10/practical-examples-of-how-blockchains-are-used-inbanking-and-the-financial-services-sector/#402e5f311a11.
See Jemima Kelly, Exclusive: Blockchain Platform Developed by Banks to be Open-source,
REUTERS (Oct. 20, 2016, 6:45 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-banksblockchain-r3-exclusive/exclusive-blockchain-platform-developed-by-banks-to-beopen-source-idUSKCN12K17E.

9

See infra Part II; see also Joshua Ashley Klayman & Dario de Martino, The (Heart)beat Has
Sounded: The World Economic Forum Places Blockchain Front and Center, 22 WESTLAW J. SEC.
LIT. & REG. 12, 2 (2016); Stuart D. Levi, Blockchains offer revolutionary potential in fintech and
beyond, PRACTITIONER INSIGHTS COMMENTS 2017 WL 954702 (Mar. 13, 2017); Reggie
O'Shields, Smart Contracts: Legal Agreements for the Blockchain, 21 N.C. BANKING INST. 177,
180–81 (2017).
10

11

See infra Part III; see also Marr, supra note 8.

12

See infra Part III; see also Marr, supra note 8.
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institutions, their clients, and other large organizations. 13 Further, this part
will provide an overview of the general analytical framework of antitrust
law and discuss leading applicable cases from the United States Supreme
Court. 14
Part V concludes with a recommendation to minimize potential
antitrust risks that financial institutions and/or large organizations might
face that are currently using blockchain in this way or are considering this
use. 15 This part outlines the United States Supreme Court’s analysis of a
joint venture’s exclusion and/or expulsion of rivals by assessing four
specific criteria, including specific examples of joint venture actions
and/or characteristics that will decrease or increase a joint venture’s
exposure to antitrust risk. 16
II.

BACKGROUND OF BLOCKCHAIN

A. The Components of Blockchain and How It Works
Blockchain is a technology containing a highly encrypted database
that maintains numerous entries of information, similar to a digital ledger
that tracks and records all of the transactions that have occurred, and are
occurring, within that specific blockchain network. 17 Blockchain confirms
the accuracy and authenticity of each transaction and encrypts each
entry. 18 Thus, blockchain is essentially a continuous series of chronological
blocks of information containing multiple specific individual transactions
See infra Part IV; see also EINER ELHAUGE & DAMIEN GERADIN, GLOBAL ANTITRUST
LAW AND ECONOMICS 153 (2nd ed. 2011); ABA Section of Antitrust Law, supra note 7,
at 490.
13

See infra Part IV; see also ELHAUGE & GERADIN, supra note 13; ABA Section of Antitrust
Law, supra note 7, at 490.
14

15

See United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n of St. Louis, 224 U.S. 383, 397, 405 (1912).

16

ABA Section of Antitrust Law, supra note 7, at 490–91.

See Klayman, supra note 10, at 2–3; Levi, supra note 10; O'Shields, supra note 10, at 180–
81.

17

18

See Klayman, supra note 10, at 2; Levis, supra note 10; O’Shields, supra note 10, at 180.
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that are verified for accuracy by the majority of users of the technology
network. 19 Further, blockchain maintains a high level of security so that
past information blocks are not altered or changed once verified. 20 “Think
of a global spreadsheet that is saved and runs on billions of computers
around the world, where the data is universally verifiable and trackable.” 21
And every new entry onto the spreadsheet “depends on a logical
relationship to all” the previous entries on the spreadsheet. 22
Many blockchains accept new entries from numerous parties;
however, one party inserting a new entry into the blockchain does not
change the blockchain until the majority of the parties accept this new
entry. 23 Parties to the blockchain accept a new entry by running the new
entry or transaction through a series of mathematical equations, which are
called hashes. 24 Thus, when a new entry is created, the transactions
comprising that block are hashed, which produces a unique result for that
block. 25 Then, other nodes that are in that blockchain network use the
same entries to create the same mathematical equations and confirm that
the result for that block that was computed by the first party is correct. 26
If the other nodes’ calculation produces a different result than the result
of the first party, the entry is not confirmed because it contains either an

19

See Klayman, supra note 10, at 2.

20

See O’Shields, supra note 10, at 187.

21

Klayman, supra note 10, at 2.

Andrew Meola, The Growing List of Applications and Use Cases of Blockchain Technology in
Business & Life, BUS. INSIDER (Sept. 28, 2017, 4:46 PM), http://www.businessinsider.
com/blockchain-technology-applications-use-cases-2017-9.
22

See Portia Crowe, There is a ‘Game Changer’ Technology on Wall Street and People Keep
Confusing it with Bitcoin, BUS. INSIDER (Mar. 5, 2016, 8:30 AM), http://www.
businessinsider.com/what-is-blockchain-2016-3?op=1.
23

24

See id.

25

See id.

26

See id.
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error or fraud. 27 This need for a majority of acceptance increases the
security of blockchain and eliminates any need for a central organization—
like a government, an accounting firm, or a bank—to approve of each new
entry and any subsequent transactions. 28
Further, the security of blockchain systems is greatly increased
because a hacker attempting to change past transactions in the chain or
conduct other fraudulent activities would require controlling a majority of
the devices or data points on the larger blockchain network. 29 Infiltrating
and taking control of the majority of the network is an incredibly hard task
and is also cost-prohibitive. 30
The blockchain technology allows both individuals and
organizations to make transactions among one another. 31 More
importantly, blockchain provides verification of each transaction,
including highly specific details of that transaction, and verification occurs
almost immediately. 32 Further, users in the same blockchain network can
engage in transactions directly with other users in the network, and
because each transaction is screened for accuracy and corroborated by the
blockchain network, there is no longer a need for a central authority to
approve the transaction and its accuracy. 33

27

See id.

28

See id.

29

See Levi, supra note 10.

30

See id.

31

See Klayman, supra note 10, at 2–3.

32

See id. at 2; Levi, supra note 10.

33

See Levi, supra note 10.
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B. Types of Blockchain
Blockchains are typically either public/permissionless or
private/permissioned. 34 Public blockchains allow for any user to
participate in the blockchain. 35 Thus, anyone can download and utilize the
blockchain software, participate in the verification process and so forth. 36
Conversely, to gain access to a private blockchain, a party needs
permission. 37 This permission is granted either through a pre-selection of
the parties that may access the blockchain, approval by an administrative
party, or satisfaction of certain requirements— for example compliance
with anti-money laundering regulations. 38
C. The Current and Future Use of Blockchain
1. Blockchain’s Use in Industries Outside of Finance
The use of blockchain far exceeds its most known use— the
technology underlying Bitcoin. 39 Blockchain, some argue, has the potential

See NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT, UNLOCKING THE BLOCKCHAIN: A GLOBAL LEGAL
REGULATORY GUIDE 20 (2016), http://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/
files/unlocking-the-blockchain-chapter-1-141574.pdf.
34

AND

See Ramesh Gopinath, Checking the Ledger: Permissioned vs. Permissionless Blockchains, IBM
THINK BLOG (July 28, 2016), https://www.ibm.com/blogs/think/2016/07/checkingthe-ledger-permissioned-vs-permissionless-blockchains/; Levi, supra note 10; Unlocking
the Blockchain: A Global Legal and Regulatory Guide, supra note 34, at 20.
35

36

See Unlocking the Blockchain: A Global Legal and Regulatory Guide, supra note 34, at 20.

37

See id.; Gopinath, supra note 35; Levi, supra note 10.

See Gopinath, supra note 35; Praveen Jayachandran, The Difference Between Public and
Private
Blockchain,
IBM
BLOCKCHAIN
BLOG
(May
31,
2017),
https://www.ibm.com/blogs/blockchain/2017/05/the-difference-between-publicand-private-blockchain/; Unlocking the Blockchain: A Global Legal and Regulatory Guide, supra
note 34, at 20.
38

39

Unlocking the Blockchain: A Global Legal and Regulatory Guide, supra note 34, at 15.
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to impact nearly every industry. 40 For example, blockchain has already
impacted large-scale data management by providing records management
for businesses and governments that is more secure, yet simpler to use,
than many other data management technologies. 41 Using blockchain
technologies for data management provides permanent, accurate data
which allows organizations to decrease the managerial cost of performing
and complying with audits and government records, among other
benefits. 42
Further, blockchain allows for enhanced identity management
“[b]y combining the decentralized blockchain principle with identity
verification, a digital ID can be created that would act as a digital
watermark which can be assigned to every online transaction of any
asset.” 43 Thus, the parties to a transaction are identifiable, which should
decrease fraud and increase the ease of organizational compliance with
governmental regulations that relate to properly identifying the other party
to the transaction. 44
2. Blockchain’s Use in Finance
Blockchain has received much attention concerning its potential
impact on the financial industry. 45 Further, key organizations within the
See Klayman, supra note 10, at 3–4; O'Shields, supra note 10, at 180–81; 21 Areas of
Blockchain Application Beyond Financial Services, MEDIUM (Mar. 13, 2017),
https://medium.com/@LetsTalkPayments/21-areas-of-blockchain-applicationbeyond-financial-services-9a007f3db2f1.
40

See Klayman, supra note 10, at 4; O'Shields, supra note 10, at 189–90; 21 Areas of
Blockchain Application Beyond Financial Services, supra note 40.

41

See Klayman, supra note 10, at 2; 21 Areas of Blockchain Application Beyond Financial Services,
supra note 40.

42

43

21 Areas of Blockchain Application Beyond Financial Services, supra note 40.

See Klayman, supra note 10, at 3; O'Shields, supra note 10, at 180–81; 21 Areas of
Blockchain Application Beyond Financial Services, supra note 40.

44

See Blockchain in Financial Services, PWC FIN. SERVS. INST. (last visited Mar. 10, 2018),
https://www.pwc.com/us/en/financial-services/research-institute/blockchain.html;
Marr, supra note 8; Alex Tapscott & Don Tapscott, How Blockchain Is Changing Finance,
45
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industry see this technology as revolutionizing the industry, as evidenced
by R3, a consortium of over seventy of the larger financial institutions in
the world including banks, insurance companies, regulators, and fund
managers. 46 R3 was created for the purpose of researching and developing
blockchain technology and then implementing that technology
throughout the financial industry globally. 47 Blockchain has and will
continue to change, and potentially revolutionize, many applications
within the finance industry, including transactions among financial
institutions and other parties, the issuance of securities, the trading and
settlement of stocks, and fraud prevention. 48 For example, in December
2016, Overstock.com, the online retailer, issued nearly two million dollars
of stock that trades only on a blockchain platform. 49 Relatedly, experts in
the stock market industry expect blockchain to enhance the stock market
by reducing the amount of time between the clearing and the settlement
of trades. 50 Although blockchain will likely impact many areas within the
financial industry, the bulk of this paper is limited to an analysis and
discussion of transactions between financial institutions and other parties,
as this particular application is one of the likelier applications to have a
large-scale impact. 51

HARV. BUS. REV. (Mar. 1, 2017), https://hbr.org/2017/03/how-blockchain-ischanging-finance;.
46

See Kelly, supra note 9.

47

See ABOUT, R3, https://www.r3.com/about/ (last visited Mar. 10, 2018).

See Klayman, supra note 10, at 2–4; Marr, supra note 8; Tapscott & Tapscott, supra note
45; 21 Areas of Blockchain Application Beyond Financial Services, supra note 40.
48

See Daniel DeConinck, Overstock Completes First Public Stock Issuance Using Blockchain, 36
REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 416, 424 (2017).
49

50

See Klayman, supra note 10, at 3.

See Klayman, supra note 10, at 3; Marr, supra note 8; Tapscott & Tapscott, supra note
45; 21 Areas of Blockchain Application Beyond Financial Services, supra note 40.
51
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III.

THE IMPACT OF BLOCKCHAIN ON TRANSACTIONS BETWEEN
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND OTHER PARTIES

The Impact of Blockchain on Transactions between Financial
Institutions and Other PartiesEvery day, trillions of dollars are transferred
among financial institutions and other parties for various financial
services. 52 The number of parties involved in these transactions reaches
the billions. 53 Importantly, in 2014, it is estimated that financial institutions
collected well over one trillion dollars in fees for processing payments and
other related transfers among customers of the banks, including small and
large organizations and individuals. 54 These fees are likely needed to cover
many necessary administrative activities performed by individuals within
the current financial system for processing payments and transferring
funds. 55
The development and implementation of blockchain throughout
the financial industry will likely have numerous benefits for all participants
in the industry, including financial institutions, businesses, and individuals,
as blockchain would likely eliminate many, if not all, of the currently
necessary intermediaries and administrative activities when banks process
payments and transfer funds. 56 Currently, financial institutions are rife
with numerous costly activities that also often add long delays that disrupt
the transfer of funds. 57 Further, these activities are not completely secure
which allows for fraudulent activities to take place and also increases the

52

See Marr, supra note 8.

53

See id.

See High Tech Meets Low Finance, THE ECONOMIST: BUTTONWOOD BLOG, (Mar. 10,
2016), http://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21694531-all-money
-spent-technology-banking-not-efficient-high-tech-meets-low.
54

55

See Tapscott & Tapscott, supra note 45.

56

See Marr, supra note 8.

57

See id.
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cost of related activities, such as fraud prevention. 58 Thus, financial
institutions implementing blockchain as a digital ledger that would keep
track of, protect, and self-audit the transfer of funds for activities like
payment processing would significantly decrease costs and increase
security and efficiency. 59 Although blockchain is not completely secure
from fraudulent activities, it stands as a marked improvement to the
current security used by many financial institutions. 60
To best implement and use blockchain within this application,
financial institutions and organizations will have to join together to
implement this technology through a joint venture, or a similar construct,
as instant electronic communication of information among the parties
through the blockchain is likely necessary for the parties to fully reap the
benefits of blockchain. 61 Thus, organizations will likely create or join
groups like the R3 consortium, 62 or take part in highly a concerted activity
like that of the largest banks in Europe, which recently implemented in
unison the same system of blockchain technology to better facilitate
international trade. 63
Agreements among competitors, like HSBC and Rabobank, two
of Europe’s largest banks, raise some interesting potential antitrust issues
and risks. 64 For example, an issue arises when two or more competitors
58

See id.

59

See Klayman, supra note 10, at 2–3.

See id.; O'Shields, supra note 10, at 179–80, 184; Tapscott & Tapscott, supra note 45; 21
Areas of Blockchain Application Beyond Financial Services, supra note 40.

60

See Klayman, supra note 10, at 1; O'Shields, supra note 10, at 183; Tapscott & Tapscott,
supra note 45.
61

62

ABOUT, R3, supra note 47.

Arjun Kharpal, Blockchain technology is moving into the financial mainstream with IBM and seven
European banks, CNBC (June 26, 2017, 6:02 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/
06/26/ibm-building-blockchain-for-seven-major-banks-trade-finance.html.
63

See id.; see also ELHAUGE & GERADIN, supra note 13, at 73–75, 153–54; ABA Section of
Antitrust Law, supra note 7, at 490–91.

64
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agree to not deal with or allow the participation of other competitors in
the formation of joint venture with the purpose of implementing
blockchain technology. 65
IV.

ANTITRUST RISKS AND ISSUES: HORIZONTAL AGREEMENTS
NOT TO DEAL WITH PARTICULAR FIRMS

A joint venture comprised of unrelated competitors that excludes
other competitors and/or refuses to provide access to the joint venture’s
facilities to other competitors is challengeable under Section 1 of the
Sherman Act, as an illegal restraint of trade, or under Section 2 of the
Sherman Act as a conspiracy or attempt to monopolize. 66 Generally, when
competitors enter into a horizontal agreement to boycott or not deal with
another competitor, this boycott is per se illegal under the Sherman Act. 67
However, when competitors join together in a joint venture or productive
collaboration, the per se rule for boycotts typically does not apply; instead,
courts apply a more nuanced analysis. 68 Specifically, when competitors
joined in a productive collaboration decide to boycott a competitor by
refusing to allow that competitor access to the productive collaboration,
courts often apply the rule of reason; 69 thus, this conduct is only
considered illegal when the effect of the boycott is an unreasonable
restraint of trade. 70 Courts applying the rule of reason standard consider if
the agreement among competitors has any “plausible procompetitive
justification.” 71 If such a justification is plausible, the plaintiff is required
to prove that the agreement’s result in an anticompetitive effect, which the
plaintiff can prove by offering direct evidence or inferring the
65

See supra note 64.

66

See ABA Section of Antitrust Law, supra note 7, at 490.

67

See ELHAUGE & GERADIN, supra note 13, at 153.

68

See id. at 153–54.

69

See id. at 74–75.

70

See id.

71

Id. at 75.
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anticompetitive effect by providing the defendant’s high market share. 72 If
the plaintiff proves this effect, the defendant then is required to provide a
procompetitive benefit of the agreement. 73 And if the defendant provides
“persuasive justification for [the agreement],” 74 the plaintiff then can show
that a “reasonable less restrictive alternative exists.” 75 If the plaintiff shows
this, the plaintiff wins. 76 However, if the plaintiff does not, the court then
weighs the procompetitive and anticompetitive effects. 77 Similarly, courts
often apply the rule of reason to situations in which a competitor was
expelled from a productive collaboration. 78
A. Relevant Leading Cases
Several leading United States Supreme Court cases address the
issue of agreements among competitors not to deal with other
competitors. In United States v. Terminal Railroad Association of St. Louis,
fourteen railroad companies in St. Louis created a joint venture for the
purpose of purchasing and operating railroad terminals. 79 The joint
venture allowed other companies outside of the joint venture to utilize the
joint venture’s terminals if the other companies paid a similar amount of
money for their use that the members of the joint venture paid. 80 The
topographical layout of St. Louis was such that anyone attempting to
transport via railroad in or through St. Louis required the use of the

72

See id.

73

See id.

74

Id. at 223 (quoting United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 679 (3d Cir. 1993)).

75

Id.

76

See id. at 75.

77

See id.

78

See id. at 153–54.

79

See United States v. Terminal R. R. Ass'n of St. Louis, 224 U.S. 383, 391, 398 (1912).

80

See id. at 399–400.
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terminals owned by the joint venture. 81 Although other companies could
technically utilize the joint venture’s terminals, the joint venture, due to
the unique layout of the city, held the power to discriminate because
without the use of its terminals, other companies could not operate in St.
Louis. 82 Further, there were charges that the joint venture discriminated
against other companies. 83 As a result, the Supreme Court ruled that the
joint venture’s practice of often not allowing other railroad companies
outside of the joint venture to use the terminals violated the Sherman
Act. 84 The Court emphasized that its holding was heavily impacted by the
topographical constraints of St. Louis and noted that typically competitors
may lawfully combine to purchase and operate terminals, even when
excluding other competitors. 85 Interestingly, the Court noted that the joint
venture “would not be an illegal restraint . . . if it were what is claimed for
it, a proper terminal association acting as the impartial agent of every line
which is under compulsion to use its instrumentalities.” 86
Many years later, in Associated Press v. United States, the Supreme
Court again addressed this issue. 87 In that case, approximately twelve
hundred newspapers in over twenty-five cities established a joint venture
to disseminate the news it gathered among the members of the joint
venture. 88 This joint venture maintained a very large market share as
Associated Press members comprised over eighty percent of the
newspaper circulation in the United States. 89 The joint venture did not
81

See id. at 397.

82

See id. at 397, 399–400.

83

See id. at 394–96.

84

See id. at 409.

85

See id. at 405.

86

Id. at 410.

87

See Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 4–8 (1945).

88

See ELHAUGE & GERADIN, supra note 13, at 166.

89

See id.
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allow for members to provide news to non-members and also provided
members of competing applicants the ability to veto a non-member’s
application of membership. 90 The Court held that these bylaws were illegal
as they restrained trade and critically “limit[ed] the opportunity of any new
paper to enter these cities.” 91 Further, the Court, using very broad
language with potentially large antitrust implications, stated that any joint
venture which reduces the opportunity of other competitors to engage in
buying or selling of “the things in which the groups compete” is an
unlawful combination. 92
The Supreme Court addressed the issue of expulsion from a joint
venture in Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery and Printing
Co. 93 In that case, a joint venture was formed as a buying cooperative for
several retail stores; however, one of the members of the joint venture was
expelled for failing to abide by the joint venture’s bylaws. 94 The Court first
addressed the proper standard to address this expulsion. 95 The Court
concluded that the expulsion did not provide evidence that the joint
venture maintained an anticompetitive motivation nor was it evidence of
a high probability of an anticompetitive effect resulting from the
expulsion. 96 Further, the Court found that “[u]nless the cooperative
possesses market power or exclusive access to an element essential to
effective competition, the conclusion that expulsion is virtually always
likely to have an anticompetitive effect is not warranted.” 97 Thus, if the
joint venture does not possess market power or exclusive access to a
90

See Associated Press, 326 U.S. at 9–10.

91

Id. at 13.

92

Id. at 15.

See Nw. Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pac. Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284, 284,
286–87 (1985).

93

94

See id. at 286—87.

95

See id. at 289–90.

96

See id. at 296–98.

97

Id. at 296.
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competitively necessary element of the business, courts must apply the
rule of reason analysis. 98 “The decision to apply the per se rule turns on
‘whether the practice facially appears to be one that would always or
almost always tend to restrict competition and decrease output . . . or
instead one designed to ‘increase economic efficiency and render markets
more, rather than less, competitive.’” 99 Further, the Supreme Court stated
that group boycotts frequently garner per se invalidation from courts; 100 yet,
the Supreme Court plainly stated that there is much uncertainty and
confusion among all the courts concerning the precise types of joint
venture activity that garner per se invalidation. 101 Additionally, the Court
stated that in many cases that the Court has ruled were per se invalid, the
boycott typically denied access to an element that was necessary for the
company to compete and the joint venture held a “dominant position” in
the market. 102 Moreover, “the possibility of countervailing procompetitive
effects [was] remote.” 103 Finally, the Supreme Court ruled that the lower
court’s decision to eschew per se analysis was correct. 104
Since Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc., cases involving a joint
venture denying a non-member competitor membership to the joint
venture or access to the joint venture’s facilities have largely eschewed a
per se analysis in favor of a rule of reason analysis. 105 Further, there appears
to be some conflict and confusion among the lower courts concerning the
holding from Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. 106 Specifically, whether a
98

See id. at 296–97.

99 Id. at 289–90 (quoting Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1,
19–20 (1979)).
100

See id. at 293.

101

See id. at 294.

102

Id.

103

Id.

104

See id. at 298.

105

See ABA Section of Antitrust Law, supra note 7, at 492.

106

See id. at 492–93.
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finding of market power or exclusive access to a component that is
necessary for the competitor to compete may be adequate in and of itself
for a court to rule that the denial of membership or expulsion from the
joint venture is per se illegal, 107 or whether this finding is just “a necessary
precondition” for a court to find that such actions are per se illegal. 108
Additionally, when courts have analyzed the competitive justifications
provided by the joint venture for denying a non-member competitor
membership to the joint venture or to the joint venture’s facilities, many
courts have recognized as valid the justification that the non-member is
seeking to benefit from the joint ventures without participating in the
initial or on-going risks and expenses associated with the joint venture. 109
Thus, in summary, the Supreme Court analyzes a joint venture’s
exclusion and/or expulsion of rivals by assessing several criteria including:
(1) the degree to which access is essential to
effective competition; (2) the nature and
scope of the joint venture’s power in the
relevant market; (3) the degree to which the
benefits of the venture can be duplicated by
nonparticipants in some other fashion, such
as the formation of a similar joint enterprise;
and (4) the business reasons for the refusal
to grant access. 110

107

See id.

108

Id. at 492.

109

See id. at 493.

110

Id. at 490–91.

726

TRANSACTIONS: THE TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

V.

[Vol. 19

ADVICE TO FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS CONSIDERING A
HORIZONTAL AGREEMENT/JOINT VENTURE WITH THE
PURPOSE OF USING BLOCKCHAIN FOR THE TRANSFER OF
FUNDS

A. What if the Joint Venture Closes Membership? Moreover, What are the
Antitrust Risks if the Joint Venture Utilizes a Permissioned Blockchain?
The initial push for blockchain technology involved largely ‘opensource’ and permissionless or public blockchain technology, which means
that this technology is completely free and available for use by any person
or organization that wants to access it. 111 The highly publicized digital
currency Bitcoin is an open-sourced technology. 112 Although the initial
blockchain developments were open-sourced and public, there have been
recent blockchain developments that were permissioned, meaning that
they are not freely available to the public as one needs permission to utilize
that specific blockchain. 113
Further, it is likely that large financial institutions will enter into a
joint venture with one another to gain access to blockchain technology
that is used as a digital ledger. 114 As stated previously regarding agreements
among competitors, like HSBC and Rabobank, a joint venture of this type
would likely necessitate limited access to the blockchain given the highly
sensitive information and large monetary value at stake. 115 Thus, potential
antitrust issues arise when a blockchain joint venture only allows members
of the joint venture access to the digital ledger blockchain, but not to a

See Cade Metz, The Bitcoin Schism Shows the Genius of Open Source, WIRED (Aug. 19, 2015,
10:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/2015/08/Bitcoin-schism-shows-genius-opensource/.

111

112

See id.

113

See Jayachandran, supra note 38.

114

See ABOUT, R3, supra note 47; Kelly, supra note 9.

115

See Gopinath, supra note 35; Jayachandran, supra note 38; Levi, supra note 10.
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non-member competitor who seeks access to the permissioned
blockchain. 116
1. The Degree To Which Access Is Essential To Effective
Competition
In Terminal Railroad Association of St. Louis, the Supreme Court
emphasized that in an ordinary competitive environment, the Court would
have ruled that the joint venture formed by the competing railroads to
operate and control specific railroad terminals was legal; 117 however, it was
“impossible for any railroad company to pass through, or even enter St.
Louis … without using the facilities entirely controlled by the terminal
company.” 118 Thus, access to the facilities was essential for other
companies to compete. 119
Thus, the antitrust risks decrease for a member of a joint venture
utilizing a permissioned blockchain when access is not necessary for rivals
to effectively compete. 120 Financial institutions currently have the ability
to transfer and receive funds and properly track, record, and audit those
transfers. 121 Further, a joint venture such as this would not “reduce their
competitor's opportunity” to provide financial transfers between financial
institutions and keep proper records of those transfers, as competitors
currently have the ability to engage in performing these types of transfers
and the resulting recording-keeping without any blockchain technology. 122
Finally, as the Supreme Court in Terminal Railroad Association of St. Louis
stated: “[i]t cannot be controverted that, in ordinary circumstances, a
116

See Unlocking the Blockchain: A Global Legal and Regulatory Guide, supra note 34, at 31, 33.

117

See United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n of St. Louis, 224 U.S. 383, 405 (1912).

118

Id. at 397.

119

See id.

120

See id.

See Gopinath, supra note 35; Jayachandran, supra note 38; Kelly, supra note 9; Levi,
supra note 10.
121

122

Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 15 (1945).
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number of independent companies might combine for the purpose of
controlling or acquiring terminals for their common but exclusive use. In
such cases other companies might be admitted upon terms or excluded
altogether.” 123
On the other hand, the antitrust risks increase as access to the
permissioned blockchain becomes necessary for non-members to
compete. 124 Such may be the case when access to a blockchain developed
by large joint ventures, like R3, becomes so prevalent and impactful that
companies that are not members of the joint venture cannot effectively
compete unless they have access. 125 In Terminal Railroad Association of St.
Louis, the Court instructed that the joint venture be dissolved unless its
members reorganized the joint venture allowing for “admission of any
existing or future railroad to joint ownership and control of the combined
terminal properties, upon such just and reasonable terms as shall place
such applying company upon a plane of equality in respect of benefits and
burdens with the present proprietary companies.” 126 Further, the Court
required that the reorganized joint venture allow any other company that
chose not to become a part of the joint venture the use of the joint
venture’s facilities so long as the other company complied with justified
terms. 127 Similarly, if a joint venture’s blockchain technology becomes
essential to competition, a joint venture, to lessen the antitrust risks, may
want to open its membership and allow reasonable access to its technology
for non-members on fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory terms. 128

123

Terminal R.R. Ass'n of St. Louis, 224 U.S. at 405.

124

See id. at 397.

125

See id.

126

Id. at 411.

127

See id.

128

See id.
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2. The Nature and Scope of the Joint Venture’s Power in the
Relevant Market
The formation of joint ventures revolving around blockchain
technology will likely involve the establishment of bylaws for their
members. 129 Generally, bylaws are necessary for the successful operation
of any joint venture, especially when that venture is comprised of
competitors; however, Associated Press clearly established that some bylaws
violate antitrust laws. 130
In Associated Press, the joint venture— comprised of over twelve
hundred newspapers with eighty percent of the newspaper circulation—
had market power. 131 It also forbade the dissemination of news to nonmembers. 132 Further, if an applicant newspaper company competed in the
same market as a member of the Associated Press, that member was given
veto power to deny the applicant admission into the Associated Press. 133
However, if an applicant newspaper did not compete with an existing
member, the board of the joint venture had the ability to admit the
applicant without approval from existing members. 134 The Supreme Court
ruled that these bylaws unlawfully restricted competition by severely
limiting a new newspaper from entering one of the cities already occupied
by a member of the Associated Press. 135 In fact, the Supreme Court stated
that “the By-Laws on their face, and without regard to their past effect,
constitute restraints of trade.” 136
129 See Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1945) (explaining importance
of bylaws).
130

See id. at 9.

131

See ELHAUGE & GERADIN, supra note 13, at 166.

132

See ABA Section of Antitrust Law, supra note 7, at 491.

133

See Associated Press, 326 U.S. at 10.

134

See id. at 10–11; ELHAUGE & GERADIN, supra note 13, at 166.

135

See Associated Press, 326 U.S. at 13.

136

Id. at 12.
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If the members of a permissioned blockchain collectively possess
market power, then the antitrust risks increase if their joint venture
provides members with a similar veto power that allows members to
essentially unilaterally restrict access and inhibit other competitors from
entering the market. 137 A court could find that this bylaw provision is
anticompetitive and illegal without analyzing or considering whether the
bylaws actually restrained trade, as the Court did in Associated Press. 138
On the other hand, the antitrust risks decrease if the members of a
permissioned blockchain do not collectively possess market power, as
their actions are less likely to restrain trade in the relevant market. 139
Further, a permissioned blockchain joint venture that does collectively
possess market power could still conceivably exclude companies from the
joint venture, similar to the veto allowed in Associated Press, 140 as long as
the joint venture implemented sufficient safeguards based around the joint
venture’s decisions to exclude. 141 Specifically, the joint venture’s decision
as to which party to exclude should have safeguards that prevent the
members of the joint venture from making a biased decision that inhibits
competition. 142 Although the Court has been dismissive of such safeguards
in the past, 143 recently the Court has been more accepting of these
safeguards. 144

137

See id. at 12–13.

138

See id. at 12.

See Nw. Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pac. Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284, 296
(1985); Associated Press, 326 U.S. at 12–13.
139

140

See Associated Press, 326 U.S. at 10–11.

141

See Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 509 (1988).

142

See id.

See ELHAUGE & GERADIN, supra note 13, at 172 (explaining Court’s holding in Silver
v. NYSE, 373 U.S. 341 (1963).

143

144

See Allied Tube & Conduit Corp., 486 U.S. at 508–10.
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3. The Degree to Which the Benefits of the Venture Can be
Duplicated by Nonparticipants in Some Other Fashion, such
as Forming a Similar Joint Enterprise
A permissioned blockchain joint venture’s antitrust risks decrease
if the joint venture and the underlying blockchain software are
duplicable. 145 For example, if the joint venture’s benefits were based on
the software’s ease of use and the competing joint venture can buy or
license similar software that has a similar ease of use, the blockchain joint
venture’s antirust risks are likely minimal in that regard. 146
On the other hand, the joint venture’s antitrust risks increase if the
blockchain software and its benefits are not duplicable by a rival joint
venture formed by competitors. 147 For instance, given the inherent
topographical limitations in Terminal Railroad Association of St. Louis, it was
extremely unlikely that a competing joint venture could build other
facilities necessary to achieve the benefits that the joint venture
maintained. 148 Moreover, one of the benefits of a joint venture, like R3, is
that all of the member financial institutions exclusively use the
permissioned blockchain technology created through the joint venture to
conduct all of their financial transfers. 149 Given this, the size of the
member financial institutions and the fact that access to the permissioned
blockchain technology is necessary for any party to participate in such
transfers, it is unlikely that competitors could form a rival joint venture
that would derive similar benefits. 150

145

See ABA Section of Antitrust Law, supra note 7, at 490–91.

146

See id.

147

See id.

148

See United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n of St. Louis, 224 U.S. 383, 405 (1912).

See Terminal R. R. Ass'n of St. Louis, 224 U.S. at 405; ABA Section of Antitrust Law,
supra note 7, at 490–91; Kelly, supra note 9.
149

150

See Terminal R. R. Ass'n of St. Louis, 224 U.S. at 405.
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4. The Business Reasons for the Refusal to Grant Access
Finally, a permissioned blockchain joint venture’s antitrust risks
decrease if it has a significant, legitimate pro-competitive business
justification for its restraint. 151 For example, if it rejected an applicant
because if the applicant were admitted, neither the applicant nor the
members of the joint venture could sustain a successful business, and there
was substantial evidence to substantiate this claim, then the court may
likely decide for the venture. 152 This is because if admittance was allowed,
the net effect would be to decrease the number of competitors in the
market, resulting in decreased competition and decreased consumer
choice. 153 Thus, it would likely help a joint venture’s argument if the joint
venture conducted an analysis for every applicant regarding the
sustainability of member businesses and the impact on consumers that
would occur if the applicant was admitted. 154
In Associated Press, the Associated Press did not conduct such an
analysis. 155 It simply allowed one competing member to maintain the
exclusive power to veto the applicant’s application. 156 Thus, an analysis
concerning the sustainability of businesses in that area could help to
differentiate the bylaws of the joint venture from the bylaws at issue in
Associated Press. 157

See Nw. Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pac. Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284,
295 (1985).
151

152

See Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 12–13 (1945).

153

See id. at 13.
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See id.
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See id. at 10–11, 13.
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See id. at 10.
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See generally id. at 8–13.
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B. Would a Joint Venture With a Permissioned Blockchain Receive Per Se
Treatment or a Rule of Reason Analysis for its Denial of Access to a
Competitor?
An additional likely concern for a member of a joint venture is
whether the denial of access to a permissioned blockchain would be
deemed per se illegal or subject to a rule of reason analysis. 158 In Northwest
Wholesale Stationers, Inc., the Court stated that the distinction between these
two standards is based on whether the conduct at issue appears on its face
to “always or almost always tend to restrict competition and decrease
output . . . or instead one designed to ‘increase economic efficiency and
render markets more, rather than less, competitive.’” 159 Thus, a court’s
choice between these two legal standards will likely be influenced by the
factors discussed above in subpart (a). 160
Therefore, a member could argue that a permissioned blockchain
would increase efficiency for the consumers as much of the administration
of the transfer of funds would move from a human function to one that
is computerized and much faster as computers would almost instantly
perform the record keeping and audit functions that are currently
performed by people. 161 Additionally, they could argue that this would
increase competition especially among the members of the joint venture
as the underlying technology that they would offer the consumer is the
same; thus, these members would likely have to compete on other factors
such as price, service, and geographic availability. 162 Similarly, competition
See Nw. Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pac. Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284, 294
(1985); Associated Press, 326 U.S. at 27.
158

Nw. Wholesale Stationers, Inc., 472 U.S. at 289–90 (quoting Broad. Music, Inc. v.
Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 19–20 (1979)).
159

160

See id.

See Gopinath, supra note 35; Jayachandran, supra note 38; Kelly, supra note 9; Levi,
supra note 10.
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See Gopinath, supra note 35; Jayachandran, supra note 38; Kelly, supra note 9; Levi,
supra note 10.
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among both members and non-members would increase, as non-members
would have to develop their own competing technology or increase other
services offered and/or decrease prices. 163 Additionally, according to the
holding in Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc., in cases where courts often
apply the per se illegal standard, the joint ventures are actively seeking to
harm the non-member through actions that are not justifiable by
procompetitive benefits, like in Associated Press. 164 Taking all of these
factors into consideration, it is unlikely that a court would apply a per se
illegal standard to a joint venture that is not open to all competitors if the
joint venture can offer significant procompetitive business justifications. 165
VI.

CONCLUSION

The popularity of blockchain has correlated with the advent, and
widespread adoption, of Bitcoin; however, uses outside of digital currency
abound for blockchain technology and its users. 166 Given that blockchain
can store vast amounts of information in a highly encrypted database, one
of blockchain’s more impactful uses will likely concern transfers among
large financial organizations and digitizing the record-keeping and audit
functions that result from these transfers. 167 Currently, these transfers cost
over one trillion dollars per year, a large part of which is likely used to
cover the administrative duties and resulting expenses that it takes to
complete these transfers. 168 Thus, financial institutions implementing
blockchain as a digital ledger to keep records for each individual

163 See Gopinath, supra note 35; Jayachandran, supra note 38; Kelly, supra note 9; Levi,
supra note 10.

See Nw. Wholesale Stationers, Inc., 472 U.S. at 294; Associated Press v. United States, 326
U.S. 1, 12–13 (1945).
164
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Nw. Wholesale Stationers, Inc., 472 U.S. at 289–90, 294.

See Klayman, supra note 10, at 1–4; Marr, supra note 8; O'Shields, supra note 10, at 181;
21 Areas of Blockchain Application Beyond Financial Services, supra note 40.
166
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See Klayman, supra note 10, at 1–4.

168

See High Tech Meets Low Finance, supra note 54.
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transaction could decrease these costs while also increasing security and
efficiency. 169
To fully realize the benefits of blockchain as a digital ledger, many
financial institutions will likely have to join together in a joint venture so
that the parties are using the same blockchain technology, as that would
enhance efficiency and maximize the utility of blockchain. 170 However, a
joint venture among competitors can give rise to unique antitrust issues,
as a joint venture of unrelated competitors that excludes or refuses other
non-member competitors from accessing the joint venture’s facilities is
challengeable under the Sherman Act. 171
As the number of large financial institutions entering joint
ventures to utilize blockchain increases, the antitrust scrutiny will likely
increase as well. 172 These joint ventures can take steps to reduce antitrust
risks. 173 Antitrust risks decrease if a joint venture proactively develops
procedures to organize and document evidentiary analysis of the
procompetitive benefits of the joint venture and the positive impact on
consumers. 174 Further, antitrust risks decrease if a permissioned
blockchain maintained by a joint venture comprised of large financial

169 See High Tech Meets Low Finance, supra note 54; Klayman, supra note 10, at 4; O'Shields,
supra note 10, at 183; 21 Areas of Blockchain Application Beyond Financial Services, supra note
40.

See High Tech Meets Low Finance, supra note 54; Klayman, supra note 10, at 4; O'Shields,
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40.
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See Unlocking the Blockchain: A Global Legal and Regulatory Guide, supra note 34, at 31–36.
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institutions provides reasonable access to competitors. 175 Additionally,
antitrust risks decrease if the resulting benefits from a joint venture’s
blockchain technology are duplicable by a competitor. 176 With significant
increases in utilization of blockchain and projections of expansion beyond
financial institutions, it is important that joint ventures consider the
antitrust risks and issues underlying the joint venture’s blockchain
technology and take proactive steps, such as those outlined above, to
decrease the antitrust risk. 177
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Ass'n of St. Louis, 224 U.S. 383, 405 (1912).
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